ABSTRACT. The primary justification for Death with Dignity legislation has been the principle of respect for autonomy. However, some have objected that if respect for autonomy is the reason for allowing physician-assisted suicide, then why not allow it for people with longer than six months to live? Defenders of the laws have responded that respect for autonomy must be balanced against the state's interest in the lives of its citizens. Persons with less than six months remaining have virtually no life left to protect; persons with more time have a meaningfully long segment of life remaining. The state can therefore overrule their autonomy interests to preserve their lives. This paper will argue that this response constitutes an ironic affront to the dignity of people with less than six months to live, for it implies that their lives are not worth enough for the state to prevent them from committing physician-assisted suicide.
INTRODUCTION
I n recent years, Oregon and Washington have enacted so-called Death with Dignity (DWD) statutes that permit patients whose doctors certify that they have less than six months to live to commit suicide with the aid of a physician. 1 The laws allow a doctor, upon the patient's request, to prescribe a lethal dosage of drugs, which the patient then self-administers.
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The primary justification for these laws has been the principle of respect for autonomy. In the context of physician-assisted suicide (PAS), this principle is said to imply that competent persons should be allowed to control the timing and manner of their own deaths to the greatest extent possible. Some have objected to this justification, however, saying that if respect for autonomy is the reason for allowing PAS, then why grant it only to persons with less than six months to live? Why not allow it for people with a year to live or longer? Indeed, why must one be terminally ill at all, if autonomy is the name of the game? Defenders of the DWD laws have responded that respect for individual autonomy must be balanced against the state's legitimate interest in the lives of its citizens. Persons with less than six months to live have virtually no life left to protect, whereas persons with more time left, or who are not terminally ill, have a meaningfully long segment of life remaining. The state can therefore overrule their autonomy interests in order to promote its own compelling interest in preserving their lives. This paper will examine this response. First, I will argue that the response, instead of providing an adequate rejoinder to the objection, constitutes an ironic affront to the dignity of people with less than six months to live, for it subtly implies that the lives of such patients are not worth enough for the state to prevent them from committing suicide. I will then consider four replies to this charge.
The first alleges that the six-month restriction is justified because the state has an obligation to protect its citizens from irrational decisions to terminate their own lives, and seeking PAS when one has longer than six months to live is not rational. The second maintains that the six-month restriction does not result from a diminished view of the lives of people with less than six months remaining; rather, it is because the value of their autonomy is thought to increase as they move closer to death. The state values their lives as much as it ever did, but their autonomy interests have grown stronger, and that is why PAS is granted for them but not for those with more time. A third rejoinder asserts that my argument may prove too much, as there are other contexts in which the values of life and autonomy are pitted against one another (e.g., when patients wish to refuse lifesustaining treatment) and where autonomy is permitted to triumph over life, yet most would not think that life was thereby being devalued. The fourth and final reply appeals to the notion of so-called clumsy institutions to justify the six-month restriction, asserting that having such a restriction affords both life and autonomy values space to assert themselves, which is desirable in contested public policy situations like the DWD context. I [ 203 ] will argue that each of these replies, in its own way, fails to address the basic concern that the lives of those with less than six months to live are not being valued as they should by current DWD legislation.
THE AUTONOMY JUSTIFICATION FOR DWD LAWS
By far, the most compelling and most frequently given justification for DWD laws arises from the moral principle of respect for autonomy. In the context of death and dying, this principle is said to imply that people should be able to determine the timing and manner of their own deaths to the extent that this is compatible with the liberties of others. Derek Humphry (2007) has notoriously referred to the right to die on one's own terms as "the ultimate civil and personal liberty." Most now accept that this autonomy interest includes at least a right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. However, there are those who hold the further belief that this autonomy over one's own death also sanctions the deliberate taking of one's own life with the help of a willing physician. A number of defenses of this latter point could be cited. Beauchamp and Childress provide a canonical formulation of the argument:
If a person freely authorizes death and makes an autonomous judgment that cessation of pain and suffering through death constitutes a personal benefit rather than a setback to interests, then active aid-in-dying at the person's request involves neither harming nor wronging. Aiding an autonomous person at his or her request to bring about death is, from this perspective, a way of showing respect for the person's autonomous choices. Similarly, denying the person access to other individuals who are willing and qualified to comply with the request shows a fundamental disrespect for the person's autonomy. (2013, pp. 182-183) 4 It is now widely believed that matters pertaining to sexual behavior, procreation, and basic control over one's own body are to be left, to the greatest extent possible, to autonomous individuals to decide for themselves. The state should not dictate views or behaviors in these areas. Many felt that recognizing a right to PAS was the logical next step for American law to take after it had found rights to the use of contraceptives (see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ), to abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992) ), and to refuse unwanted medical treatment (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) ). The holdings in these other areas were said alternatively to emanate from basic kennedy institUte of ethics joUrnal • sePtember 2013 [ 204 ] liberty interests or the right to privacy. For the state to legislate in these areas would thus infringe upon personal liberty or privacy too much. But if these matters are to be left to the individual, then surely control over one's own death should be as well.
5 How one dies would seem to be every bit as personal and private, every bit the sole province of the individual, as what one does in any other area of one's life.
To many, having this autonomy in death is essential to dying with dignity. Much of the indignity in dying arises with the loss of control. Things happen to you that you do not want to happen. You do not want to continue. You are suffering and want to die but you cannot. You are forced to carry on without the things that make life enjoyable, perhaps even with the loss of control over your bodily functions, and this is an affront to your dignity. Thus, having the ability to die on your own terms, to avoid such things if you choose, can provide you with a greater sense of dignity.
A BASIC OBJECTION Despite its initial plausibility, the above argument from autonomy suffers from at least one very serious defect, at least insofar as it is offered to justify the Oregon and Washington laws: it has no intrinsic way to limit its application to people with less than six months to live. It can certainly apply to such people, but it would seem to apply to any other autonomous individual as well. Respect for autonomy is a sweeping, high-powered moral principle, and once it has been invoked, it is difficult to contain. All persons seemingly have the same autonomy interest in controlling the timing and manner of their own deaths. Why, then, should PAS be available only to people with less than six months to live? Why not terminal people with a year to live? Why not non-terminally ill people for that matter? As is well-known, PAS is legal in the Netherlands and one does not have to be terminally ill to avail oneself of it. One only needs to have a condition that involves unbearable suffering with no prospect for improvement for that person to receive PAS (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). But if people have a right to control the timing and manner of their own deaths, then even the relatively liberal Dutch law does not go far enough. If one decides that she wants to die now with the aid of a willing physician, then that person should be able to do so even if the person is not sick in any way. Moreover, there is no reason why control over one's death should be limited to those wishing to commit suicide with a physician's help; the patient should also be permitted to have a willing doctor administer the lethal drugs (e.g., via injection) to him. That is, there is no reason why the
autonomy rationale could not be deployed to justify voluntary euthanasia, as well as PAS.
6 Daniel Callahan, a long-time opponent of PAS, expresses the thrust of the forgoing points this way:
There will remain no logical way in the future to . . . deny euthanasia to any competent person who requests it for whatever reason, terminal illness or not. . . . I am not saying that such a scenario will in fact take place, but only that the arguments given in favor of euthanasia logically entail the possibility. We can erect legal safeguards and specify required procedures to keep that scenario from coming to pass, but over time they will provide poor protection if the logic of the moral premises on which they are based is fatally flawed. The safeguards will appear arbitrary and flimsy and will invite covert evasion or outright rejection. (2002, pp. 61-62 ; see also Keown 2002, p. 79) Now, someone of a strong libertarian frame of mind might not see any problem here. She may be willing to make PAS available to everyone of sound mind who wants it. But for others this would constitute a reductio ad absurdum of the argument. Such widespread PAS would be unthinkable to many, including some proponents of the DWD laws. Is there any way to use autonomy as a justification for the DWD laws and yet limit the argument in a principled way so that the laws apply only to people with less than six months to live? THE REPLY TO THE BASIC OBJECTION Autonomy rights do not exist in a vacuum. They exist in a context where other legitimate rights and values can clash with them. Oregon and Washington's current restriction of PAS to terminal patients with less than six months to live undoubtedly represents an attempt to balance autonomy interests against other competing interests. First and foremost among these competing interests is the state's interest in the preservation of human life. This surely involves the state having an interest in protecting the lives of its individual citizens, but it could also include an interest in ensuring that the general value of life is held in high regard by its citizens. In keeping with the latter, the state may seek to enact policies that reinforce the value of life and avoid other policies that may lead people to cherish life less or suggest that the state does not value it that highly. Secondly, there is the state's interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession. Perhaps, if physicians began to provide widespread assistance in suicide, that would compromise their role as healers in the eyes of the public. The public may lose trust in them and fear that they would not do all they could to preserve kennedy institUte of ethics joUrnal • sePtember 2013 [ 206 ] the lives of their patients. Next, the state may desire to protect vulnerable groups (the poor, the elderly, and the disabled) from being encouraged or pressured toward PAS. The fear is that such groups will come to be seen as excessive drains on resources and be unduly nudged toward PAS in an effort to save money. Finally, the state may wish to prevent a slide down the "slippery slope" to nonvoluntary euthanasia (the administration of a lethal injection to an incompetent patient) and involuntary euthanasia (the administration of a lethal injection to a competent patient who wishes to live). PAS represents a step beyond the mere withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment from a patient to the intentional provision of assistance to a patient to commit suicide. Opponents have long feared that such a move would inevitably lead to people (perhaps those in the vulnerable groups just mentioned) being euthanized against their will. All of the preceding values could clash with the autonomy interests of dying patients and have been invoked to oppose PAS.
It is a modest irony that the state of Washington, where PAS is now legal, asserted its interest in the above values to oppose PAS in the case of Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) .
7 At the time, Washington had a law prohibiting PAS. Some terminally ill patients, along with their physicians, challenged the law in court, alleging that it violated a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 14th Amendment. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court held that there is no constitutional right to PAS, for while individuals may have an autonomy interest in controlling the timing and manner of their own deaths, that interest does not rise to the level of a fundamental right. Therefore, the state's interest in the lives of its citizens, along with the other interests just mentioned, can trump this autonomy interest. States are thus not obligated to make PAS available to their citizens, even in light of the strong autonomy interests that patients have (that is, they can make PAS available; they just do not have to).
The Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence reflects similar thinking. Roe v. Wade, of course, recognized a fundamental autonomy right that allows women to terminate their pregnancies. Yet Roe and subsequent holdings (e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey) also permit states to regulate abortion and even ban it altogether after the point of fetal viability (the point at which the fetus can live outside of the uterus).
8 The reason such allowance is made to states is that they may take a "substantial" or "profound" interest in the lives of viable fetuses, and this interest can outweigh the woman's basic liberty interest in controlling her own reproductive destiny (see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-879).
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Many states (including Washington) have laws that essentially ban abortion after viability unless an abortion is needed to preserve the life of the mother (see for example Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.110 (1992) ). So, even in the abortion context, autonomy interests do not reign absolutely; they are checked by the state's interests in preserving life.
The apparent point of Washington and Oregon's six-month limitation, then, is the preservation and promotion of the earlier mentioned competing values. These states desire to allow patient self-determination when it comes to dying, but they also do not want this allowance to compromise other significant values. The six-month restriction reflects a concession to both sets of values. Terminal patients with less than six months of life remaining are given the freedom to exercise control over the timing and manner of their own deaths. But this exercise of autonomy is not given a blank check, for prior to the six-month mark, the state's important interest in preserving life (and other values) can outweigh personal autonomy.
However, this does not explain what changes at the six-month point. Why is it that before the six-month point the other state interests prevail over the value of autonomy, but after that point autonomy takes precedence? The implications that a physician's participation in her patient's suicide may hold for the integrity of the medical profession would seem to be as present after the six-month point as before it. Any threat to vulnerable groups would seemingly be just as strong after the point as before it. And if the slippery slope down to involuntary euthanasia is a genuine threat, it would seem to be just as much so after the six-month point as before.
It will surely not suffice to say that nothing really changes after that point and that the six-month cutoff is just an arbitrary stipulation put in place to preserve the competing values and for no more reason than that the line had to be drawn somewhere. For then the cutoff and its justification would have no means to resist the pressures either to liberalize the current law or to make it more restrictive-and such pressures will surely come. Suppose a PAS-favoring group were to campaign to alter the six-month line to some other time (e.g., one year), or to remove the terminal illness requirement altogether (as is the case in the Netherlands). Or suppose a PAS-opposed coalition, wanting to chip away at the law, campaigns to restrict its availability to patients who have less than one month to live and are such that all other pain management techniques have failed for them. Little could be said to resist either faction if the six-month restriction is nothing more than an arbitrary line put in place as an attempt to preserve both values. Imagine the state replying to such attempts by saying that the six-month [ 208 ] line had no essential reason for being what it is, but that nevertheless the line could not be changed to anything else. Such a response would serve only to arouse more suspicion and opposition to the law's six-month line. True, laws sometimes draw arbitrary lines (e.g., an April 15th deadline for filing tax returns), but PAS is a profoundly controversial issue in our society. If the government is going to legislate about it, then the law and its various provisions arguably need to be well-grounded and free from the appearance of arbitrary legislative fiat.
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There is one potentially relevant quantity that does seem to change, however: the amount of life the patient has left. One could argue that as the patient moves closer to death, there is less life for the state to protect, and so the state's interest in that patient's life could weaken correspondingly and give way to the patient's autonomous desire to end her life. Moreover, the value of preserving life is arguably the most significant of those mentioned earlier. Indeed, the other values appear to derive their significance from the value of life. We would not be concerned about protecting vulnerable groups, preserving the integrity of the medical profession, or preventing the slippery slope if we did not care about the preservation of life. The fears associated with compromising those values ultimately involve fears about loss of life (e.g., if we came to allow involuntary euthanasia, lives would be wrongly taken and society would come to hold a lower view of life). Thus if the preservation of life is the state's primary competing interest and its value wanes as the patient moves closer to death, then perhaps there is a basis for the six-month restriction.
Indeed, some proponents of DWD laws offer statements that appear to commit them to such a view. They assert that the lives of people with less than six months to live are essentially over. Thus there is really no life remaining for the state to protect, and therefore if these people wish to exercise their autonomy to end their lives with a physician's help, they may do so. Those with more time remaining or who are not terminally ill have significant time left. The state can therefore assert its interest in these people's lives and disallow PAS for them. The following remarks from ethicist Michael Gill are illustrative: Someone who . . . commits suicide while healthy is throwing away the capacity for self-determination. If she does not . . . commit suicide, she will be able to make her own decisions for years to come, but if she [commits suicide], she will not be able to make her own future decisions. But a person who is about to die is not going to be able to make decisions for years to come, whether she commits suicide or not. She is not throwing away her [ 209 ] ability to determine her future because that ability no longer exists. So the autonomy-based justification of assisted suicide for terminal individuals is completely compatible with the prohibitions on . . . assisted suicide for healthy, non-terminal individuals. PAS proponents can consistently condemn actions that destroy the ability to make future decisions, because the suicide of a terminal individual is not a case of such destruction. (2005, p. 56; emphasis added) 10 Note the time references in the quote. The future-determining ability of people with less than six months to live "no longer exists." But nonterminal people will be able to determine their own futures "for years to come." People in the latter category have enough life remaining for the state to take an interest in, but people in the former category do not. So the state can invoke its interest in its citizens' lives to trump their autonomy interests in controlling the timing and manner of their own deaths. People in the former category do not have enough life remaining for the state to prevent them from exercising autonomy over their own deaths.
Kathryn Tucker, who is now director of legal affairs for Compassion and Choices (an organization that advocates for DWD legislation and improved end-of-life care), has advocated the same type of rationale for the restriction of PAS to terminal patients on the very brink of death. She was the lead attorney for Glucksberg et al. in the Glucksberg case. The justices pressed her on this question of how, if autonomy was the principal reason for allowing PAS, PAS could be limited only to people with less than six months to live. Why not people with longer life expectancies? She replied that we do draw the line at a patient who is confronting death. That individual has a very different choice than the one you posit. This individual does not have a choice between living and dying. This dying patient whose dying process has begun and is underway, this individual has only the choice of how to die. . . .
[A person who is not on the threshold of death] and is not allowed to make this choice may one day rejoice in that. It is an individual who has an expectation of life that could then be a fruitful and fulfilling life which is not the case with a patient whose life is ending due to the progress of terminal illness. That patient has an entirely different character of interest.
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For Tucker, as with Gill, the point appears to be that those with less than six months to live are about to die anyway, but those with more time have a meaningfully long segment of life remaining, and the state can prevent their access to PAS in the name of preserving that meaningful stretch of life. To my mind, the reply that Gill and Tucker make is gravely inadequate. People with less than six months to live are not dead yet. They still have some time left. If they were already dead, the discussion of whether PAS should be made available to them would be moot. Apparently, they just do not have enough time left for the state to say that its interest in their lives is strong enough to overrule their autonomy interests. Consider, however, the oft-observed (but never trite) fact that we are all terminal. Death is inevitable for all of us. It is only a question of how long. Does six months count as too short a span for the state to protect? Does one year? Three years? Five years? The judgment that a life of length x is too short to protect, while a life of length y is sufficiently long for the state to protect is clearly a value judgment. The states of Oregon and Washington, whether deliberately or not, are thus making a value judgment concerning how long a life span one must have to make it worth overruling that person's autonomy. And they are telling those with less than six months to live that their span is not long enough. Thus the individual's right to exercise her autonomy to control her death comes only at the expense of the state's estimation of the value of her remaining life.
12 This, I believe, reflects a distinctly and ironically undignified side of DWD legislation. DWD laws may promote dignity in one way by offering terminal patients a greater degree of control over the circumstances of their deaths. But the dignity they confer with one hand is taken away with the other by the subtle indignity of allowing people to control their deaths only after the state has decided their remaining life is too short for it to protect. DWD legislation is, therefore, not a clear-cut victory for patient autonomy or patient rights. For autonomy receives permission to operate only after the state relinquishes its claim on your life, and it relinquishes its claim only when it judges that your life is no longer of sufficient length for it to wield control over. This, again, is surely an affront to, a slap in the face of, the dignity of those with less than six months to live. These people are basically being told that since they are as good as dead anyway, they may exercise their autonomy to end their lives with a doctor's help. If they had what the state deemed to be an appreciable length of time left, the state would overrule their autonomy interest and tell them they must go on living. Can such a state of affairs honestly be characterized as a victory for autonomy?
Of course, a person with less than six months to live may report that she does not feel the state is devaluing her life with the legislation's six-
month barrier. She may not feel that her life has been slighted in the least by the law; instead, she may feel that she genuinely matters to the state because it valued her autonomy enough to permit her to determine her own course with respect to her death. She must realize, though, that this supposed validation of her autonomy only comes because the state has decided that her life is not long enough to warrant vetoing her autonomy. If it did judge that her life was long enough, it surely would veto her autonomy, since that is precisely what it does for those with more than six months remaining. Now, I am not saying that the governments of Oregon and Washington actually believe that the lives of people with less than six months to live are not as valuable as other people's lives. I do not believe DWD laws represent state-run conspiracies against the sick (or the aged), nor are they attempts to cut insurance costs. I am willing simply to concede that they are motivated by true compassion for the dying. The problem is that the state prohibits PAS prior to the six-month point because its interest in your life is too strong, but then allows it after that point (even if that allowance is given in the name of honoring your autonomy), and this makes it difficult to walk away without feeling that the state does not regard your life as highly as it once did. The autonomy interest in controlling your death is surely there before the six-month point, but the state's interest in your life officially outweighs it. Yet after the six-month point your autonomy interest in controlling the timing and manner of your death suddenly receives permission to operate. For better or worse, legislation teaches and reinforces moral values in society. If the state asserts, even indirectly and inadvertently, that people with less than six months to live do not have lives long enough for it to protect, it is communicating the wrong message. This implicit devaluation of the lives of those with less than six months to live detracts from their dignity and so reflects an undignified side of DWD legislation.
THE RATIONALITY RESPONSE
One might respond to the problem I raise in the preceding section by arguing that the state can legitimately place limits on PAS's availability (as in allowing it only for terminally ill individuals with less than six months) because the state has a duty to protect its citizens from irrational or ill-considered decisions to end their lives. The desire to end one's life when one has a good deal of time left or when one is not terminally ill is an inherently irrational or ill-considered one, so the state can justifiably [ 212 ] prohibit PAS for such people. Individuals whose basic mental competence is in question are not truly autonomous and so the autonomy argument for PAS cannot be appropriately applied to them. By contrast, it can be rational for a person with less than six months to live to choose PAS and so, in the name of honoring autonomy, the state may permit PAS for her. There is, then, a principled basis for the six-month barrier.
This response will not suffice. The state is just imposing a value judgment that any rational, non-terminal person or person with more than six months of life remaining should always prefer to live, and therefore anyone in that category who does not want to live must be irrational or ill-informed. It is not obviously irrational for a person who is suffering from a painful, debilitating, but non-terminal, condition to seek PAS. This is not to say that she might not still be in the throes of some judgmentclouding mental illness or that it would necessarily be morally right for her to have access to PAS, only that it is not plainly irrational for her to seek PAS. Certainly, those who rest their case for PAS on the autonomy argument should not welcome such state-imposed value judgments about what it is rational to prefer in these situations. For supporters of PAS frequently argue that such private matters as how one dies, matters which involve one's most basic philosophical views and values, are best left to the individual. 13 The state should not legislate in those areas. Thus the state should also not smuggle value judgments into its standards of rational, autonomous decision making and then legislate them to its citizens.
Furthermore, under what account of rationality would it be rational to commit suicide when one has less than six months, but irrational to do it when one has longer? It is clear, then, that the appeal to rationality cannot provide a principled basis for the six-month restriction.
THE INCREASING AUTONOMY VALUE RESPONSE
A second rejoinder to the problem I raise against the Gill/Tucker reply would allege a certain slippage in my argument. Strictly speaking, that the state at point A values your life too much to let you exercise your autonomy to end your life, but at point B allows you to exercise your autonomy to end your life, does not entail that the state values your life less at point B than it did at point A. Perhaps something else changes at the six-month point? It could be that the state now views your autonomy interest as having become stronger than it was. The state might value your life as much as it ever did, but believes that the value of your autonomy interest increases as your death draws closer. Your newly invigorated autonomy [ 213 ] interest now trumps the state's interest in your life. There is no indignity in this for the person with less than six months to live, for the source of the indignity was the state's implicit devaluation of the person's life, and that is not present if the six-month restriction is instead founded upon the increasing autonomy interests of the person as the person nears death.
Is it plausible to regard autonomy interests as growing in strength as people move closer to their demise? There is the practice of sometimes granting special privileges or last requests to people who are at death's door, and this may seem to support the claim. There is, of course, the well-known work of the Make-A-Wish Foundation, which grants wishes to children with life-threatening conditions. Many prisons even grant limited requests to death row inmates on the eve of their executions (e.g., a certain meal the prisoner would like). I do not believe these cases demonstrate that the strength of autonomy interests increases in proportion to the individual's nearness to death, however. The examples seem to be less about respect for autonomy and more about showing kindness to a dying person. True, we are giving them something they want, but it is not for the sake of promoting autonomy; it is for the sake of bringing some cheer into their final hours. No one could seriously argue that the death-row inmate has a right to a cheeseburger and fries that issues from his general autonomy interests. Nor could we say that about a dying child who wishes to meet Peyton Manning. It is a special privilege that he receives because he is very sick and because people are willing to accommodate his request. Those who argue for PAS on grounds of autonomy believe it is a right, not merely a privilege that people can receive if we feel compassion for them and have the means to grant their request. In addition, even if we were to grant the basic idea that autonomy rights somehow grow stronger the closer one is to death, we would still be left with new versions of our original questions: why draw the line at six months rather than one year or some other time? We are no more advanced in terms of having a principled justification for the six-month restriction than we were before.
THE PROVES-TOO-MUCH RESPONSE
As already discussed, the six-month requirement reflects the state's attempt to strike a balance between the value of the patient's life and the value of her autonomy. The concern I have been pressing, however, is that this can seem to suggest that, in the eyes of the state, the lives of patients with less than six months are no longer of sufficient length or value to prevent them from committing suicide. The earlier described comments [ 214 ] of Gill and Tucker to the effect that patients with less than six months are essentially at death's door, while those with longer have significant time remaining, exacerbate this concern greatly. However, one may be tempted to respond to this point with a charge that my argument perhaps proves too much. There are other settings in which the values of life and autonomy compete with one another and where the state has decided to let autonomy win. One clear example would be state and federal laws that allow competent patients to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
14 Generally, such laws, though they ultimately grant victory to autonomy, acknowledge that the state also has a profound interest in protecting the lives of its citizens. In its Cruzan holding, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that while competent persons indeed possess a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, this interest still must function against the backdrop of the state's interest in protecting life. 15 Since the values of life and autonomy are both invoked, yet the value of autonomy is declared the victor, my argument may seem to imply that the state is not valuing the lives of people in these cases as well. And this would not be a welcome result, as I do not believe that allowing patients to refuse life-saving treatment shows governmental disregard for their lives.
There is, however, an important difference between DWD legislation with its six-month requirement and the law on forgoing life-sustaining treatment, a difference that I believe blocks the extension of my argument to the latter. It is no affront to the worth of a patient's life for the state to allow her to refuse medical treatment if this allowance is given because compelling her to receive treatment against her will would be unlawful. In Cruzan, the court remarked that forcing medical treatment upon an unwilling competent patient would constitute battery, and that this could not be done, however much the state may value the patient's life. 16 The right to control what happens to one's own body is as fundamental a right in American law as any could be. To touch a person against that person's wishes, even for the sake of providing medical care, is therefore a serious offense. So the state may honestly regard the patient's life as being of inestimable value, and yet still allow the patient to forgo life-sustaining treatment, for it cannot lawfully do otherwise. The state can thus permit the patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment without that suggesting a diminished estimation of the worth of the patient's life.
Matters are considerably different in the DWD situation. Here, the state cannot maintain that it places enormous value on the patient's life but has no choice but to defer to the patient's autonomy. This is because
the state does not allow persons whose doctors estimate that they have more than six months to live to have PAS but does permit it for those with less than six months. The state cannot plausibly claim that its hands are legally tied with respect to those with less than six months and so it must grant their requests for PAS (regardless of how much it values those people's lives), but at the same time deny the autonomous wishes of those with more time left. As discussed earlier, there are no good grounds for claiming that people with less than six months to live have stronger autonomy interests than those with more life remaining. Now, if Oregon and Washington had simply granted PAS to anyone of sound mind who requested it on the grounds that there was a fundamental constitutional right to it and they could not lawfully forbid access to it, then their situation would be much more like that of refusing life-sustaining treatment. But since they have enacted the six-month line, their DWD laws suggest a devaluation of the lives of those with less than six months to live. So my argument applies to their laws but cannot plausibly be extended to the law on refusing life-sustaining treatment.
Another setting in which my argument may strike some as carrying an unwelcome implication is in connection to the Netherlands' fairly liberal law on physician-assisted death. As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands law does not require that the patient have less than six months remaining, nor even that the patient be terminally ill. The patient need only have a condition that causes him unbearable suffering with no prospect for improvement. Nevertheless, this still constitutes an eligibility requirement, a dividing line of sorts. One who was suffering, but not unbearably so, but who still, for whatever reason, desired to be euthanized could not be under Dutch law. Similarly, one who was suffering unbearably at present but who had a reasonable prospect for improvement would also not be permitted to end his life with a doctor's assistance. Would my argument, then, imply that the lives of those who meet the requirement are not as valuable to the Dutch government as those who do not? 17 Two responses to this question are in order. First, though I believe the Netherlands policy is in some ways better than that of Oregon and Washington (especially with respect to the six-month criterion), for reasons that need not be discussed here, I am not a supporter of it. So even if my argument carried negative implications for it, I would not regard that as a serious problem. Second, even if we grant provisional legitimacy to the Dutch law, it is not clear that my argument implies that the law devalues patients' lives. Whether it does imply this depends greatly upon what the [ 216 ] rationale for the law is. Respect for autonomy is no doubt one rationale for the law, but it would seem that the autonomy one is entitled to wield over one's death would be the same for those who are suffering unbearably with no prospect of improvement and those who are not. The autonomy principle thus cannot provide a principled basis for treating the two groups differently, and so if that were the only justification for the law, we may well be concerned that the government was not valuing the lives of the qualifying group as it should. There may also be considerations of mercy underwriting the law, though. That is, those who are suffering unbearably with afflictions that have no chance for improvement and who want a physician's help to die should be able to receive that help because that is the merciful thing to do and people in such horrible conditions deserve mercy. It is not that the lives of such people are not as important to the government as other people's lives. It is rather that those who are suffering unbearably with no prospect for improvement warrant more mercy than those who are suffering less, and therefore we may justly grant the requests for euthanasia of those in the former group while denying the requests of those in the latter group. Perhaps such a consideration could be offered to justify the Netherlands law, and, if so, then it is far from clear that my argument would apply to it. I am not saying that the mercy point would necessarily succeed, but it does at least have the potential for justifying the disparate treatment of the two groups in a principled manner, and in a way that would not devalue the patients' lives in any obvious way. It could be entirely appropriate to show greater mercy to someone who was suffering unbearably than someone who was experiencing bearable suffering.
Again, however, matters are different with the Oregon and Washington laws. It does not appear that the mercy consideration can be plausibly invoked with respect to them, and as before it is the six-month line that is getting in the way. What happens after the six-month point that makes one a greater candidate for mercy than someone with more time? The patient can suffer unbearably from her affliction before that point, and she may well have no better prospects for improvement before that point. So the considerations that might support mercy's application to justify the Netherlands law will not apply here. It might be replied (after the manner of Gill and Tucker) that those with less than six months remaining are right at death's door while those with more time are not and that this can be a basis for showing greater mercy to the former. But this would not remove the arbitrariness of the six-month line, for even if closeness to death could serve as a basis for how much mercy one receives, it would
[ 217 ] seemingly have to work as a sliding scale and not an all-or-nothing affair. The Oregon and Washington laws are essentially an all-or-nothing affair: if you have shorter than six months left, you receive mercy; if you have longer, you do not. And we still lack an explanation for why the cutoff is placed at six months instead of elsewhere. Thus my argument can demonstrate a life-devaluation problem for the Oregon and Washington laws without necessarily raising a similar problem for either the Netherlands policy or the law allowing refusal of life-saving treatment.
THE CLUMSY INSTITUTIONS RESPONSE
It is possible to anticipate a response to my critique from the general field of cultural theory 18 and its concept of clumsy institutions in the law in particular. To my knowledge, no one has ever formally invoked the notion of clumsy institutions to justify DWD legislation, but, for reasons that will soon become clear, it would be quite natural to do so. Clumsy institutions are desirable policy situations in which important but opposed values or positions on an issue can coexist, and while one value may officially triumph over another in the way that a policy is set up, the other is still allowed space to assert itself as well. In a collection of essays entitled
Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World, Marco Verweij et al. describe clumsy institutions this way:
The term "clumsy institution" was coined . . . as a way of escaping from the idea that, when we are faced with contradictory definitions of problem and solution, we must choose one and reject the rest. Clumsy institutions . . . are those institutional arrangements in which none of the voices . . . is excluded, and in which the contestation is harnessed to constructive, if noisy, argumentation.
Clumsiness emerges as preferable to elegance (optimizing around just one of the definitions of the problem and, in the process, silencing the other voices) once we realize that what looks like irreconcilable contradiction is, in fact, essential contestation. (2006, pp. 19-20) Law professor and bioethicist Michael Shapiro, who first coined the term "clumsy institution," sets forth the practice of judicial selection as an example of a clumsy institution (1988, pp. 1560-1562) . In the United States, federal judges (including district court judges, appellate court judges, and the justices of the Supreme Court) are appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate, and, once confirmed, they receive what is essentially a lifelong appointment. They are not elected to [ 218 ] their positions by the people, nor are they retained in their positions by election. The judicial selection process functions like this because we do not want those who interpret the law to be too subject to public opinion. We want the judiciary to be independent of majority rule so that the rule of law can flourish. Still, this may seem like a slap in the face of democracy. The people have no direct say on who is appointed. However, the Senate must confirm the nominated judge, and Senators are elected by the majority in each state. Thus there is some indirect accountability to the people. So the values of judicial independence and the rule of law officially prevail, but the value of democracy is not utterly cast aside either. It is a somewhat awkward compromise, but one that is effective in such situations-situations where we want "both ends of a dilemma" (1988, p. 1562) .
Current U.S. abortion policy can also serve as an example of a clumsy institution. 19 Prior to the point of fetal viability the woman's right to control her body carries more weight than the fetus's right to life, but after viability, the fetus's life can be regarded as more important than the woman's autonomy. It is not an elegant solution, but it represents an attempt to preserve both the value of the woman's autonomy and the fetus's life. The hope is that the woman's autonomy over her body can be respected without that leading to a worrisome devaluation of human life. Of course, people on both sides of the debate may be dissatisfied with the policy and continue to advocate for changes to it. But this is just part of the "essential contestation" of which Verweij et al. 2006 speaks; indeed, the ongoing abortion controversy is itself a part of the clumsy institution of U.S. abortion policy and helps to ensure that both values are represented without one extinguishing the other.
With the notion of clumsy institutions now in place, we are poised to anticipate a clumsy response to my objection. As in the abortion case, PAS pits the two values of autonomy and life against each other. Allowing PAS promotes the autonomy of those who wish to avail themselves of it. But those who oppose PAS fear that by permitting it we may be eroding the value of life and that this may have dire consequences. So DWD legislation, with its six-month restriction, creates a kind of clumsy institution by honoring autonomy and yet placing the six-month restriction on who may use it. The value of life is maintained, since only those who are very near death can request PAS, but autonomy is fostered as well by the very allowance of PAS. Now, I have been arguing that the six-month restriction carries bad implications for the value of life. Prior to that point your life is too valuable for the state to allow PAS for you, but after that point
you can have PAS, and this seems to imply a devaluation of your life in the eyes of the state. However, a respondent armed with the concept of clumsy institutions can reply that the devaluation of life is only apparent. Actually, the state is striving to preserve the value of life by its very enactment of the six-month line. Yet it also desires to promote patient autonomy and so it grants PAS to patients with less than six months to live. The state is trying to look in two directions at the same time, and, of course, it is difficult to look graceful when one is doing that. But an insistence upon moral elegance in this situation is misguided, for in this case there is no way to maintain both of these profoundly important values without seeming to do a bit of violence to one or both of them.
Though the clumsy institution idea is intriguing in its own right and might prove helpful in certain contexts, it does not provide a satisfying response to the problem I have raised against DWD legislation. While invoking the clumsiness concept offers some reassurance that the general value of life is being taken seriously, it still does not address the concern about the specific value of the lives of people with less than six months to live. The states of Oregon and Washington may be making a statement about their commitment to the value of life with the six-month restriction. They may be saying that human life is too precious to let just any person commit suicide with a physician's help. This statement is too clumsy, however. It perhaps hits the broad target of affirming life's value in general, but it misses the narrower target of affirming the value of the lives of patients who are not expected to last longer than six months. We still have not explained why we are willing to allow PAS to those with less than six months left. Are their lives no longer precious enough to overrule their autonomy? The clumsy institution response has no real answer to this question. 20 Saying that we are willing to provide PAS to them because they want it and that we are just honoring their autonomy-not disrespecting the value of their lives-obviously will not suffice. People with more than six months of life left to them sometimes want it too and have an autonomy interest in controlling the timing and manner of their own deaths, but the DWD laws do not allow PAS for them. Why the disparity in treatment for the two groups? That the lives of people with less than six months left are too short to merit the same protection appears to be the only answer in the vicinity. This, I maintain, is a singular affront to them, and it does not appreciably soften this blow to be told that a clumsy institution is at work. A fairly obvious retort to my criticism of the clumsy institution response is that this indignity to those with less than six months to live is simply the price we must pay to reinforce both autonomy and life values. It is part and parcel of clumsy institutions to have such collateral damage. This may be true, but it cannot, by itself, comprise an adequate response. For there are other ways a clumsy institution could be enacted with respect to PAS, ways that do not carry this indignity with them. For example, we could have our usual laws against various forms of homicide, but be loose in our interpretation of these laws and/or lax in their enforcement in cases of assisted suicide (whether the assistance came from a physician or someone else). 21 Indeed, this undoubtedly occurs in some jurisdictions. Here the value of life is the "official" winner in the clash of values between life and autonomy, but autonomy is still unofficially permitted to operate. I am not advocating this proposal. I offer it only to show that the two values can be preserved in a clumsy institution without tacitly communicating that the lives of people with less than six months to live are not long enough to warrant protection from suicide. That the six-month restriction confers this indignity upon those with less than six months to live has not been adequately appreciated and should, at the very least, be factored into considerations of which form of clumsy institution for PAS, if any, would be best. CONCLUSION DWD legislation pits two values against each other: the value of individual autonomy and the state's valuation of the lives of its citizens. DWD legislation attempts to endorse both but ends up cheapening the lives and dignity of those with less than six months to live. For this reason, I believe the present way of doing things in Oregon and Washington is problematic at best. Perhaps the DWD laws can be justified by appeal to another principle besides respect for autonomy and then these problems will not arise. However, for any justification of the laws that is offered the challenge of explaining why that justification grants PAS for people with less than six months but not for others will likely remain. My argument is thus consistent with either of two courses of action. We could say that individual autonomy is the paramount value and radically expand the practice of PAS to include essentially anyone of sound mind who asked for it. Nothing in my argument would militate against this. I do not believe the people of the United States presently have the stomach for this, nor do I think that this would have very strong constitutional support. For
example, one of the main justifications for there being a constitutional right to engage in a practice is that the practice is rooted in our nation's history. That certainly cannot be said of PAS (see e.g., Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 710-719). But, for now, I will allow that my argument permits this rather libertarian possibility. The other course of action is to say that life is the paramount value and disallow PAS altogether. Some states have taken this approach, enacting specific statutes that criminalize assisting in the suicide of another.
22 I offer no argument to choose between these two options. The former stance may seem to neglect the value of life, while the latter may seem to neglect the value of autonomy. Yet both values are promoted in other settings in our society. Autonomy is promoted in such areas as religious practice, free speech, and the right to refuse medical treatment, among others. The value of life is promoted in our laws against homicide, laws requiring seat belts, and numerous other places. So if either life or autonomy is not fully promoted in the PAS context, it will not be utterly devalued in society. But in the context of Oregon's and Washington's DWD legislation, specific individuals (those with less than six months to live) are singled out and effectively told that their lives are not of sufficient value to the state for it to protect them. This value cannot be recouped elsewhere. The undesirable course is thus to grant PAS on the ground that the right to control the timing and manner of one's own death sanctions it, but then allow PAS only to those with less than six months to live because the state places too much value on the lives of those with more time to allow PAS for them. This is not a dignity-promoting way to confer the right to PAS on those with less than six months to live, for it implies that they are, for all intents and purposes, as good as dead already. NOTES 1. Physician-assisted suicide is also legal in the state of Montana, though it did not become so via legislative act, but instead by a ruling of the Montana Supreme Court in the case of Baxter v. Montana, 354 Mont. 234 (2009) . The court held that though Montana's constitution did not guarantee a right to die, nothing in Montana law suggested that allowing physician aid in dying was contrary to public policy. The court did not clearly settle what procedural requirements would have to be observed in these cases. The court's holding appears to require the patient to have an "incurable or irreversible condition" that will bring about the patient's death "within a relatively short time" (Baxter, . The Montana legislature has thus far failed to enact any additional requirements. Campbell 2009 , Lindsay 2009 , Hedberg et al. 2009 , and Finlay and George 2011 . Ronald Dworkin, another distinguished defender of this position, goes so far as to say that making someone die on the terms of others "is a devastating, odious form of tyranny" (1993, p. 217) . The autonomy argument is also stated well (though not endorsed) by Arras (1998, p. 281) . 5. Indeed, this is precisely how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned in the case of Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) . Writing for the majority, Justice Reinhardt argued that these matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. . . . Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime," a choice "central to personal dignity and autonomy." A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane death rather than being reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent. (pp. 813-814) The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the holding in this case, however, in Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U. S. 702 (1997 With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. (Roe, 410 U.S. at [163] [164] [ 224 ]
However one may assess the plausibility of the viability line, at least the Court attempts to provide a principled justification for it, and this, from a public policy standpoint, is clearly preferable to setting a line arbitrarily, especially when dealing with profoundly contentious matters. Suppose, instead, that the court had simply decreed that states must allow abortion prior to six months gestation but could ban it after that point. Suppose further that the only justification offered for the viability line was that some line had to be drawn somewhere in order to preserve both values. I submit that such a scenario would be seen by many as an affront to the basic rule of law in the United States. 10. It should be noted that Gill is not, in this passage, attempting to justify the six-month restriction per se. He is actually responding to a somewhat different objection that maintains that using the principle of respect for autonomy to justify DWD laws actually leads to a reductio ad absurdum of the laws. How, it is argued, can respect for autonomy be used to justify PAS when the application of PAS will lead to the death of the patient and therefore the end of the patient's autonomy? PAS obviously cannot promote patient autonomy when it leads to the cessation of that autonomy. Leon Kass has been a no- Non-terminal patients, however, will continue to be able to exercise their autonomy for perhaps years to come, and so PAS should not be allowed for them. Of course, such a reply also comprises a very natural response to the question of why patients must be terminally ill and on the very brink of death (i.e., having less than six months to live) to avail themselves of the DWD laws, and I have appropriated it as such. 11. Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110, Transcript of Oral Argument, 1997 WL 13671 (January 1997), pp. 28, 33. For additional discussion of Tucker's remarks, see Kamisar 2002, pp. 82-83. 12 . Other opponents of PAS have made the point that an implicit devaluation of the patient's life ultimately underlies the allowance of PAS as much as, or perhaps more than, a concern for the patient's autonomy. Callahan states, for example, to establish physician-assisted suicide as social policy is, first, to side with those who say that some suffering is meaningless and unnecessary, to be relieved as decisively as possible, and that only individuals can determine what such suffering is; and, second, to say that such a highly variable, highly subjective matter is best left to the irrevocable judgment of doctor and patient. This is not a neutral Glucksberg, No. 96-110, 1996 WL 708956 (1996 14. This proves-too-much worry, and its application to the case of refusing lifesustaining treatment, was raised by an anonymous reviewer for this journal. 15. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-282. It should be pointed out, though, that
Cruzan's talk of balancing patient autonomy against the state's interest in life is primarily directed at situations involving incompetent patients. The Court held that, in the interest of life, a state may enact strong evidential safeguards to ensure that termination of treatment would be what the incompetent patient would want. However, nothing in Cruzan suggests that a state could compel a patient to undergo life-sustaining treatment if that patient had clearly expressed her desire not to receive such treatment. And this would be so even for incompetent patients who had so expressed their wishes while still competent. Thus, despite the Court's talk of balancing, there is actually very little of that going on. Once it has clearly made itself heard, autonomy wins hands down. Indeed, the Court's allowance of the aforementioned evidential safeguards can be viewed equally well as a measure to protect autonomy (since the safeguards are put in place to ensure that the patient's actual wishes are carried out) as one to protect life. 16. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-271. 17. This question was proposed by the same anonymous reviewer as the one concerning the laws allowing patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
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18. The term "cultural theory" is a shorter way of referring to the theory of sociocultural viability. It is also sometimes referred to as "grid-group analysis." See Douglas 1987; Thompson et al. 1990; and Thompson et al. 1999. 19 . For a discussion of how current abortion policy in France comprises a clumsy institution see Kahan et al. 2006, pp. 169-171. 20 . One may charge that if this is the case, then the clumsy institution of abortion disrespects the lives of fetuses (i.e., before viability, the fetus's life is not worth enough to protect it from the mother's use of her bodily autonomy, but after viability it is worth enough), and therefore my argument commits me to a rejection of current abortion policy as well. While I would have no objections to doing away with our current abortion policy, I do not believe my criticism of the clumsy institution response commits me to this. There is no question as to the personhood of potential PAS patients, and because they are persons, it can be wrong to treat them in ways that do not respect their personhood (e.g., communicating to them that their lives are not sufficiently long to warrant protection from suicide). Those who would be concerned about the extension of my argument to abortion likely would not regard fetuses as persons and so would not believe that they can suffer the same sort of indignity. 21. Shapiro refers to such a situation as a clumsy institution (1988, p. 1569, n. 38 
